BYOD and the BlackBerry Effect

One could make the argument that the company Research in Motion (RIM) Ltd., later called BlackBerry Limited, first opened the door through which BYOD charged. BlackBerry got two things right, which led to its meteoric rise. Interestingly, one of those same things led to the company's subsequent decline.

The first thing BlackBerry got right was the development of the BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) in 1999. The BES enabled BlackBerry devices to receive "push" e-mails from Microsoft Exchange Servers, which meant that users could send and receive e-mails no matter where they were (assuming they had cell coverage, which by then was nearly everywhere).

The second thing BlackBerry got right was to focus its sales effort on IT departments rather than on individual consumers. This was a brilliant move, because at the time, to receive push e-mails from a Microsoft Exchange server, all but the most technical users needed IT support. This put IT in control—which is exactly how IT likes it.

More to the point, BlackBerry designed its product to suit its customers' wants and needs—which in the case of IT meant easy integration, broad control capability, and decent security (although there were some security issues). The strategy worked brilliantly. By 2010, BlackBerry boasted 36 million users worldwide. However, many people point to this strategy of selling to IT as the root cause of BlackBerry's subsequent rapid decline.

In 2007, Apple introduced the iPhone, the first of the so-called smartphones. The Android phone quickly followed. Both of these devices (along with others) could also receive push e-mails from Microsoft Exchange servers. Where they differed was their focus on consumer satisfaction and, in the case of the iPhone, on individual prestige. Even the initial launch of the iPhone, which supported no third-party apps, was touted as a BlackBerry killer. With the release of the iPhone 2 in 2008 and its ability to run third-party applications (along with the unveiling of the App Store), the end was near for BlackBerry.

By this time, it was a relatively simple matter to connect to a Microsoft Exchange server without a lot of help from IT. And while many IT departments had a strong preference for BlackBerry standardization, more and more people began showing up at work with iPhones and Android phones. A small but vocal minority pushed to allow third-party devices. If they were told no, many simply did it anyway. As the number of consumer-oriented devices grew, IT was forced to support them.

In the context of this chapter, the real takeaway is that more than any other company, BlackBerry got companies and government organizations accustomed to the idea of employees having mobile devices, giving them near 24/7 access to e-mail no matter where they went. Up to this point, wireless technology had blurred the line between work and not work, but that just meant you could use wireless to connect, shut down and move, and then reconnect. BlackBerry was truly mobile, meaning you could stay connected even as you traveled from place to place. Now workers could (and did) check and respond to e-mail all the time—at dinner, at their kid's soccer game, and (unfortunately) while driving. With this newfound connectedness, the line between work and not work was all but erased.

Many critics of BlackBerry point to it as cautionary tale of a company that failed to adapt. But few can deny that BlackBerry changed not only how people work, but also the relationship between companies and employees to a degree not seen since the industrial revolution. It also—unintentionally— opened a new front in the in the battle for IT security.

Taken from : Wireless and Mobile Device Security